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CASENOTE

The Sony Impact on
Home Videorecording: Time for a
Legislative Solution
INTRODUCTION

The advent of new technology presents a recurring problem to
policy-makers in the realm of intellectual property. Technological
innovations often highlight the competing interests at stake in the
copyright scheme. The following expresses the essence of this conflict between the interests of authors and society:
[We] must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time
for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their
just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor
the progress of the arts be retarded.1
In the United States the adaptation of copyright law to contemporary conditions has often been accomplished by judicial decision.2 Recent advancements in audiovisual technology which have
1. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.140 (K.B. 1785).
2. The courts have applied the various copyright statutes to new situations
not anticipated by Congress, where, if fairly construed, such situations came
within the intent and meaning of the applicable statute. Accordingly, although
the radio had not been developed at the time the 1909 Copyright Act was enacted,
the radio broadcasting of a copyrighted musical composition was held a public
performance for profit, and thus an infringement of the copyright. Jerome H.
Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1924). Similarly, it was held that a photograph was a copy
and infringement of a copyrighted engraving under statutes passed before the
photographic process had been developed. Rossiter v. Hall, 20 F. Cas. 1253
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 12,082)., Another case where a court had anticipated the
extension of the copyright law was Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)
where copyright was expressly recognized for motion pictures under the 1909 Act,
and the Supreme Court held a production of "Ben Hur" to constitute an infringement of the copyrighted book. A more recent example of the court's willingness to
adapt copyright to new forms of creative expression is illustrated by Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). The court determined that
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increased public access to televised copyrighted materials are the
focus of current judicial attention.' In Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Sony Corp. of America,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that home videorecording of copyrighted works broadcast
over the public airwaves for private noncommercial use constitutes
copyright infringement.5 The case presents the classic dilemma of
copyright law: how to allow public access to copyrighted materials
without impairing the author's motivation to create new works.
This note will examine the three major issues addressed by the
court of appeals: (1) whether off-the-air taping of copyrighted audiovisual materials by owners of a videotape recorder in their
homes for private noncommercial use constitutes an infringement;
(2) whether the corporate defendants are liable under theories of
direct or contributory infringement or vicarious liability; and (3) if
liability is established, the nature of the relief to be granted. It will
then analyze the court's decision in light of previous cases and discuss the importance of developing a legislative solution to the
problem of home videotaping.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Federal authority to enact copyright legislation is found in the
Constitution which grants Congress the power "[tlo promote the
considering the entire effect of the game as it appears and sounds, a videogame's

repetitive sequences of images was copyrightable as an audiovisual display.
3. The home videorecorder (VTR) enables consumers to copy or record programs broadcast on television. Programs can be taped with or without the viewer
present. Furthermore, a viewer may watch one program and simultaneously record another. The tapes may be retained for future viewing or erased and reused.
The subject of the present controversy is the Betamax (VTR) manufactured by
the Sony Corporation. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480
F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). However, the issues raised in the Sony decision
would apply to all videotape recorders and devices with similar capabilities. For a
technical discussion of videotape recorders, see Cole, Home Videotaping of Copyright Material: Cracks in the 1976 Copyright Act?, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 215, 218-24
(1982).
4. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982), argued
Jan. 18, 1983, 51 U.S.L.W. 3543, 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983), rearguedOct. 3, 1983,
52 U.S.L.W. 3277, 3285 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983).
5. 659 F.2d at 969. Shortly after the court of appeals issued its opinion, Universal sued 42 other manufacturers and distributors of videotape recorders including RCA, Zenith, Sears, Panasonic, Sanyo and Toshiba in the Central District
Court of California. "RCA et al. case" No. 81-5723 FW. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorariin Betamax Case, [Nov. 1981 - Apr. 1982] PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 572, at D-3 (Mar. 25, 1982).
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." The underlying rationale of the copyright scheme is that providing an economic incentive to authors7 in
the form of an "exclusive" monopoly is the most efficient means of
advancing the creation and dissemination of intellectual and creative works for the general public good.' The courts have repeatedly
recognized that the ultimate purpose of the copyright scheme is to
benefit society, 9 while the reward to the author is a secondary
consideration. 0
To achieve this constitutional goal, matters relating to copy6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. The term author is used here in its constitutional sense to mean "he to
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
8. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). In Mazer, the Supreme Court stated:
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and the useful Arts.'" Id. at 219. This traditional economic rationale is challenged in Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84
HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970). For a rebuttal to the Breyer article, see Tyerman, The
Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to
ProfessorBreyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1100 (1971). But cf. Breyer, Copyright: A
Rejoinder, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 75 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts .

. .

. IT]he ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stim-

ulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors."). See also 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A] (1982); L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 8-10 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 219 ("The copyright law ... makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration."); Berlin v. E.C. Publications,
Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)
("[C]opyright protection is designed [t]o promote the [plrogress of [s]cience and
useful [a]rts, and the financial reward guaranteed to the copyright holder is but
an incident of this general objective rather than an end in itself."). See also the
House Report to the 1909 Act stating, "Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given." H.R. REP.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). But see Chafee, Reflections on the Law of
Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 506 (1945) ("The primary purpose of copyright is, of course, to benefit the author.").
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right have been the subject of federal legislation since 1790." The
various revisions of federal copyright laws came in response to increasing technological innovations, as well as the recognition that
various forms of expression already in existence were creative and
worthy of copyright protection. Comprehensive revisions were enacted in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976.12 After the Copyright Act of
1909,13 a wide range of new technologies for "capturing and com4
municating printed matter, visual images, and recorded sounds"'
were developed, rendering the Act obsolete. The-Copyright Act of
197615 was enacted to accommodate these technological advancements into the established legal framework of the copyright laws.
However, the new Act did not address all of the new technological
discoveries to which the copyright law would apply. For example,
the 1976 Copyright Act contained no specific provision dealing
with the videotape recording of television broadcasts for home use,
although the technology had been developed prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act.' 6
Federal copyright protection is predicated upon two funda11. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. This act was entitled, "An Act
for the encouragement of learning by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned." Id.
For a discussion of the historical development of copyright protection, see L.
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); Comment, Copyright:
Limitation on Exclusive Rights, Fair Use, 13 Hous. L. REV. 1041, 1042-46 (1976).
12. Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (amended 1870); Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075 (codified and reenacted 1947, amended 1976); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810) (Supp. IV 1980).
13. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
14. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5660 [hereinafter cited as 1976 CONG. NEWS].
Technological advancements made since 1909 include: motion pictures, radio,
sound recordings, television, computers, cable television, photocopying, and videotape recording. Copyright protection for motion pictures was provided by the
Townsend Amendment of 1912. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5, 37 Stat. 488
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970)). Responding to the record piracy problem in the
sound recording industry, Congress granted limited copyright protection to sound
recordings for the first time in 1971. The Sound Recording Amendment of 1971,
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15,
1972-Jan. 1, 1975).
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. IV 1980).
16. Models of the Betamax have been manufactured since 1965. Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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originality1 7 and fixation in tangible form.' 8 The

exclusive rights granted the copyright owner are enumerated in
section 106, and can be described generally as rights of reproduction, derivation, publication, performance and display. 9 Infringement of a copyright occurs when any one of these rights is violated.20 These seemingly exclusive rights of the copyright owner

17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The standard of originality required for copyright is
that which had been established by the courts under the 1909 Act. See, e.g., Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970) ("In order
to be copyrightable, the work must be the original work of the copyright claimant
...[b]ut the originality necessary to support a copyright merely calls for independent creation, not novelty.") (citations omitted); Fisher-Price Toys, Div. of
Quaker Oats Co. v. My-Toy Co., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Originality refers to individuality of expression or independent creation, and the originality requirement is little more than a prohibition against copying.). Section 102
lists seven broad categories which illustrate the general areas of copyrightable
subject matter: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The fixation must be "sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101. This would appear to have the
effect of precluding the copyrightability of live broadcasts, but § 101 provides that
a simultaneous recording of a transmission satisfies the required element of
fixation.
19. The full text of § 106, entitled "Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works"
provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomines, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomines, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
20. Id. § 501(2). In the case of videotaping audiovisual works for home use,
two possible infringements occur. Section 106(1) grants the copyright owner the
right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." Copies are
defined in § 101 as "material objects. . . in which a work is fixed by any method
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are qualified by the express exemptions in the statute2 and the
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." A videotape recording would be encompassed by this definition. Accordingly, when an individual makes a videotape of a copyrighted audiovisual work, he
may infringe § 106(1). If he also makes deletions or other modifications while
recording the work, the copyright owner's right to prepare derivative works may
be implicated. A derivative work is defined in § 101 as
a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a. . .motion
picture version .. .or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions. . . or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Thus, an infringement of § 106(2) may also occur. The rights of publication, performance and display all involve public activities and are thus not pertinent in
the context of noncommercial home use. See supra note 19.
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-118. A summary of each of the exemptions in the statute
follows.
Section 108 allows libraries and archives to reproduce single copies and phonorecords of copyrighted works for noncommercial uses, for their own archival
purposes or for distribution to members of the public, subject to certain limitations. However, § 108 does not permit reproduction or distribution of a musical
work, a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work or a motion picture or other audiovisual work except for audiovisual works dealing with news.
According to § 109, the owner of a lawfully made copy or phonorecord of a
copyrighted work may, without consent of the copyright owner, sell or publicly
display the copy or phonorecord, either directly or indirectly, provided that only a
single image is presented to viewers at the place where the copy is located. However, this privilege does not extend to one who possesses a copy or phonorecord
without having acquired ownership.
Section 110 provides for limited rights of performance and display of certain
copyrighted works in connection with: instructional activities, religious services,
noncommercial public performances (excluding transmissions), agricultural or
horticultural fairs, or for noncommercial purposes to provide modified forms of
the work suitable for blind, deaf or other handicapped persons.
Under § 111, certain secondary transmissions of broadcasts are permitted,
including those by cable systems which are made subject to a compulsory licensing system to compensate the copyright owners for certain such uses. Videotaping
of television broadcasts by cable systems for later secondary transmissions is also
allowed in certain circumstances.
Section 112 allows certain broadcasting organizations, governmental bodies
and nonprofit organizations to make limited numbers of copies of a particular
transmission program for delayed transmission or for archival preservation.
According to § 113, the copyright owner's right to reproduce a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work includes the right to reproduce the work in both useful and nonuseful articles.
Section 114 limits the rights of a copyright owner of a sound recording to the
rights of reproduction, derivation, and distribution, thus specifically excluding the
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doctrine of fair use.22 The rights to use copyrighted materials pro-

vided in the exemption sections 108-118, stand independently of
the fair use rights granted by section 107.
The 1976 Act for the first time provides express statutory recognition of the judicially created doctrine of fair use. 3 No single
definition of the concept has ever emerged.24 In fact, as the House
Report states: "[Slince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason
no generally applicable definition is possible .... 1125
right of public performance. These rights are constricted further to the reproduction of the actual sounds fixed in the recording and preparation of derivative
works in which the actual sounds are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in
sequence or quality. Imitative or simulated performances and recordings are not
protected. Finally, § 114 provides that the exclusive rights of a copyright owner
in a sound recording do not extend to sound recordings in educational television
and radio programs distributed or transmitted by public broadcasting entities,
provided that copies or phonorecords of those programs are not distributed to the
general public.
Under § 115, when the copyright owner in a nondramatic musical work has
permitted public distribution of phonorecords of the work in the United States,
any other person may obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work to the public, subject to certain conditions and limitations.
According to § 116, the rights of the owners of copyright in nondramatic musical works are subject to a compulsory license for the use of phonorecords of such
works in coin-operated phonorecord players (jukeboxes).
Section 117 permits limited copying of computer programs, where such copying is necessary for the operation of such computers or is for archival purposes.
Finally, § 118 provides for the compulsory licensing of copyrighted works in
connection with noncommercial broadcasting.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 107. "The concepts of fair use and exemption should not be
confused. An exemption is an express statutory provision which removes an activity from the scope of copyright protection. Fair use is a noninfringement of an
otherwise protected area." See L. SELTZER, supra note 9, at 17.
23. The concept of fair use was first introduced in the United States in Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Mr. Justice Story
summarized:
In short, we must often look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.
Id. at 348.
24. One commentator has defined fair use as "a privilege in others than the
owner of a copyright. . . to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the
copyright." H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944),
quoted in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 65, reprinted in 1976 CONG. NEWS
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The fair use doctrine stands as one of the most important limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners.26 The doctrine
permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when on occasion, such application would stifle the very creativity
which the copyright law is designed to foster.2 7 Fair use is an equitable, affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement. The
defense is commonly asserted by one who claims to have made a
reasonable use of the copyrighted material.
Section 107 codifies the criteria developed by the courts under
the 1909 Act to determine when a use is "fair use."28 The provision
was not intended to expand or narrow the doctrine, but merely to
restate it.2

s

The factors to be considered in determining whether

the fair use doctrine applies in a given situation include: 0

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.81
The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of
copyright. 2
at 5679.

26. Id., reprinted in 1976 CONG. NEWS at 5678.

27. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co.,

621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 65, reprinted in 1976 CONG. NEws
at 5679.
29. Id. at 66, reprinted in 1976 CONG. NEWS at 5680. "The bill endorses the

purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of
rapid technological change .... [C]ourts must be free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis." Id.

30. The word "include" is defined in the statute as being "illustrative and
not limitative." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
31. Id. § 107.
32. Id. This statement in the statute has caused a few commentators to question who now has the burden of proof on this issue. Fair use has generally been
considered as a defense by most courts and commentators and as such, the burden of proving fair use lies with the defendant. See, e.g., Marsh, Betamax and
Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage,21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 56-58 (1981); Comment, supra note 11, at 1059-60.

[1983:3831

SONY AND HOME VIDEORECORDING
REPORT OF THE CASE

Facts
Ifn Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,"
Universal Studios and Walt Disney, copyright owners of audiovisual materials, brought a copyright infringement action against the
Sony Corporation, manufacturer of the Betamax (VTR), and
others in the marketing chain.3 4 The plaintiffs argued that home
videorecording of copyrighted materials broadcast on television
constitutes infringement35 and that Sony was directly, contributorily or vicariously liable for the infringement.38 Plaintiffs sought
broad injunctive relief,37 in addition to profits and damages. The
defendants contended that home videorecording did not infringe
the plaintiffs' copyrights, and even if it did, the defendants could
not be held liable under any of the proposed theories.38
The Ninth Circuit held that off-the-air copying of copyrighted
audiovisual materials by owners of videotape recorders in their
homes for private noncommercial use constitutes an infringement
and does not qualify as fair use. 9 The court of appeals further con33. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979),

cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982).

34. The plaintiffs also joined as defendants the American distributor of the
Betamax (SONAM), four retail establishments, the advertising agency promoting
the Betamax, and one individual owner and user.
35. Copyrights attach to television programs when they are recorded. Because most television programming consists of prerecorded videotape, copyright
attaches prior to the airing of those programs. Live television broadcasts are now
customarily recorded at the time of transmission. Under the 1976 Act, recording
simultaneously with transmission satisfies the fixation element and allows copyright protection to attach. 17 U.S.C. § 101. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text. See also New Boston Television, Inc. v. Entertainment Sports Programming,
1981 Copyright Law Decisions (CCH) V25, 293 (D.C. Mass. 1981) (The videotaping of sporting events off-the-air when transmitted by television stations
simultaneously fixing the event on videotape was a copyright infringement for
which a preliminary injunction could be granted.); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, §
1.08[C][2].
36. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 432. This note will not discuss plaintiffs' claims
that all corporate defendants were liable for unfair competition and fraudulent
business practices in violation of state law or that the defendant retailers' recording of portions of programs for demonstration purposes constituted copyright
infringement.
37. Id. at 463. See infra text accompanying note 133.
38. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 432.
39. Sony, 659 F.2d at 969 & 971. The district court had concluded that home
use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves did not constitute
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cluded that the manufacturer, distributor, advertiser and retailers
of the Betamax were liable as contributory infringers for the video-

recording activity. 40 In remanding the case for consideration of

three affirmative defenses and a determination of appropriate relief, the court of appeals outlined the alternatives which the district court might consider in fashioning a remedy. 4 ' However, reso42
lution of the case now lies in the hands of the Supreme Court
unless Congress takes action on the legislation which has been proposed since the controversial decision was rendered."'
Issue of Infringement
The court of appeals first addressed the basic issue of infringement in terms of whether there exists an implied exemption for

infringement under either the old or the new act and was a fair use. Sony, 480 F.
Supp. at 469. The lower court also held that even if home videorecording did
constitute copyright infringement, the corporate defendants were not directly,
contributorily or vicariously liable for the infringement. Id. at 457.
40. Sony, 659 F.2d at 975.
41. Id. at 976. The court expressly directed reconsideration of granting temporary and final injunctive relief which the district court had previously determined to be inappropriate. Other options suggested were an award of statutory
damages, actual damages and the imposition of continuing royalties. The court
intimated that the royalty relief might well be the most acceptable resolution in
this context. The Ninth Circuit explicitly cautioned the district court not to be
overly concerned with the prospective harm that might result from the relief
awarded. "A defendant has no right to expect a return on investment from activities which violate the copyright laws." Id. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
42. The Supreme Court granted certiorari June 14, 1982. See 50 U.S.L.W.
3982 (June 14, 1982). The case was argued before the Court on January 18, 1983,
and reargued on October 3, 1983. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
Betamax Case, [Nov. 1981 - Apr. 1982] PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
No. 572, at D-1 (Mar. 25, 1982).
43. The court of appeals' decision brought an immediate response from Congress. Within two days, four separate bills were proposed which would have effectively overturned the decision. Full texts of these bills-H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794,
H.R. 4808 and S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)-can be found in [May - Oct.
1981] PAT.

TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.

(BNA) No. 551, at AA-2 (Oct. 22, 1981)

and id. No. 552, at A-1, A-2 (Oct. 29, 1981). Another bill seeking to overturn the
Ninth Circuit decision, H.R. 5250, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), was introduced
Dec. 15, 1981. The full text of H.R. 5250 can be found in [Nov. 1981 - Apr. 1982]
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 561, at A-15 (Jan. 7, 1982). It seems
likely, however, that Congress will delay taking action on the proposed measures
until the Court has rendered its decision. 51 U.S.L.W. 3475 (Jan. 4, 1983). See
infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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home videorecording in the 1976 Act. It concluded that the language and statutory framework were unambiguous: the exclusive
rights granted in section 106 are limited only by the statutory exceptions found in sections 107-117."
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had inadvertently bypassed this statutory framework and thus misapprehended the scope of the inquiry by characterizing the issue as being whether section 106 was intended to give copyright holders of
audiovisual works protection from home-use videorecording. According to the court of appeals, the proper inquiry was whether
Congress intended to limit the rights of copyright owners in ways
not enumerated by the statute in sections 107-118.4' Taken from
this perspective, the Ninth Circuit found that the conclusion of the
lower court-that an implied exception for home videorecording
exists which is analogous to that recognized for home-use sound
46
recordings-was erroneous.
While recognizing a similarity to the sound recording situation, the court of appeals justified different judicial treatment for
home videorecording on several grounds, concluding that the anal44. Sony, 659 F.2d at 966. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
45. Sony, 659 F.2d at 966. See supra note 21-22.
46. Sony, 659 F.2d at 966. In reaching the conclusion of noninfringement, the

district court had relied heavily on the legislative history of The Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971, Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, to find
that an implied exemption for home-use sound recordings existed. The court

found the following passage from the House Report which accompanied the 1971
Amendment to be persuasive:
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings it is
the intention of the Committee that this limited copyright not grant any
broader rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee
to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records,
of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.
H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1572 [hereinafter cited as 1971 CONG. NEws]. Statements from committee hearings, floor debates, and reports from the Office of
Copyrights were found to supply additional support. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at
445-46. Reasoning that this exemption for sound recordings was carried over to
the 1976 Act, the court extended the same rationale to home videorecording, concluding that as with sound recordings, Congress did not intend to give copyright
owners monopoly power over off-the-air recording of their works for private noncommercial use. Id. at 446.
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ogy drawn by the district court was "simply without foundation. '47
At the outset, the court noted that the 1976 Act explicitly separates sound recordings and audiovisual works into two distinct categories of protected subject matter. 48 Moreover, the fact that audiovisual works had been excluded from some exemptions in the
1976 Act 49 indicated to the court that Congress was exhibiting special concern for these works.50
The reviewing court's second justification for different treatment was that much of the rationale which supported the recognition of an exemption for the home recording of sound recordings
was not applicable to videorecording." 1 The court pointed out that
at the time that copyright protection was first extended to sound
recordings, 2 home audiorecording, whether from broadcasts, tapes
or records, was a "common and unrestrained practice."5 3 Home
videorecording, on the other hand, in 1971, was still in its infancy.5 4 In any event, motion pictures had been protected by the
copyright laws since 1912."
Perhaps most significant to the court of appeals was the fact
that Congress was not addressing the problem of home videorecording in its discussion of the 1971 legislation. 6 Neither the
statute itself nor the House and Senate Reports accompanying the
1976 Act provide for a broad-based home-use exception.57 Therefore, the court found that the district court's reliance upon the legislative history of the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment was totally misplaced. Furthermore, the court concluded that even if
there existed a foundation to analogize between the 1971 legisla47. Sony, 659 F.2d at 968.

48. Section 102(a)(6) is "motion pictures and other audiovisual works," and §
102(a)(7) is "sound recordings." See supra note 17.
49. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(h), 110(1), 112(a).
50. Sony, 659 F.2d at 967. See also Marsh, supra note 32, at 62-67 for an
explanation of why the special concern for audiovisual works exists.
51. Sony, 659 F.2d at 967.

52. See supra note 14.

53. Sony, 659 F.2d at 967 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 487, supra note 46, reprinted in 1971 CONG. NEWS at 1572).

54. Sony, 659 F.2d at 968. Models of the Betamax have been manufactured

since 1965. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 435.

55. Sony, 659 F.2d at 968. See supra note 14.

56. In fact, as the court noted, the House Report to the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment carefully excluded sounds accompanying motion pictures from
the scope of that particular piece of legislation. Sony, 659 F.2d at 968. See H.R.
REP. No. 487, supra note 46, at 5-6, reprinted in 1971 CONG. NEWS at 1570-71.

57. Sony, 659 F.2d at 968.
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tion and the 1976 Act, when the statute is unambiguous, legislative
history is irrelevant.58
The Fair Use Doctrine
The court of appeals then addressed the applicability of the
fair use doctrine to the problem of home videorecording. The
Ninth Circuit determined that application of the fair use doctrine
was not warranted because home videorecording involves the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the same purpose as the original and does not involve a productive use.59 In reaching this conclusion, the court not only distinguished Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States,60 but also explicitly rejected that court's approach
to fair use analysis.61
Although the court of appeals concluded that the fair use doctrine does not sanction home videorecording, it proceeded to analyze the four statutory factors to be considered in determining
whether a given use is a fair use:" the purpose and character of the
58. Id. at 969.
59. Id. at 971-72. The court observed that fair use has traditionally involved
"productive uses" of copyrighted material. Id. at 970. The term "productive"
implies that the user incorporates the copyrighted material in a developmental
process which either results in the creation of a separate and independent work or
occurs in the course of research or education. See generally L. SELTZER, supra
note 9, at 24-26; Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use"
Looks Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REv. 1005, 1012-14 (1980).
60. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975). It was determined by the Court of Claims that copying by two government libraries of entire articles published in the plaintiff's medical and scientific
journals was a fair use. The libraries operated a system under which they regularly filled requests for journal articles by photocopying those articles. (Approximately 200,000 articles were copied annually.) The Sony court pointed out that
the "consequences attendant upon reduced consumer control of access [in this
case] do not in any way correspond to the deleterious consequences of reduced
access identified by the Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins"-i.e., serious
damage to medical science if the copying practices were found to be an infringement. Sony, 659 F.2d at 971.
61. Sony, 659 F.2d at 971. The court of appeals found that the Wilkins approach of treating intrinsic use as within the ambit of fair use "created doctrinal
confusion that raises the spectre of the evisceration of the traditional workings of
the copyright scheme." Id.
62. The district court prefaced its analysis of these factors by noting two features which they found distinguished the Sony case from previous cases involving
fair use:
(1) Home-use recording is done by individuals or families in the privacy of their own home for use in their home and
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use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the taking, and the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work." The Ninth Circuit found that
an analysis of the statutory factors supported their initial determination that home videorecording was not a fair use of the copyrighted materials.""
In looking to the first factor, the purpose and character of the
use, the court of appeals decided that since copying of audiovisual
works for convenience sake or for increased access to the consumer
does not promote a traditionally accepted purpose (such as criticism, research or other independent work), a finding of fair use was
not warranted on this ground."s The Ninth Circuit criticized the
lower court's emphasis on the noncommercial and private nature of
the use involved."' The court noted that the statute contrasts com-

mercial and nonprofit educational purposes rather than simply

making a commercial/noncommercial distinction. 7 Furthermore,
the court of appeals did not find that the home situs of the videotaping justified a blanket exemption from any liability." The court
suggested that the privacy concerns would be more appropriately
addressed in fashioning the proper relief. The court also summarily
dismissed the first amendment argument raised.6 9
(2) The material copied has been voluntarily sold by the authors for
broadcast over the public airwaves to private homes free of charge.
These distinctions ...

shape the four factors of the traditional fair

use analysis and guide the court in defining appropriate expectations, of
the copyright holder and the public.
Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 450.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
64. The district court had concluded that home videorecording for private,
noncommercial use was a fair use of the copyrighted materials. Sony, 480 F. Supp.
at 456.
65. The district court found the purpose of the use was to increase access to
materials which the plaintiffs had voluntarily chosen to broadcast over the public
airwaves. Id. at 454. In examining the purpose factor, the lower court again analogized to sound recordings to find that fair use was not limited to independent use,
concluding that, "[s]ection 106 of the New Act does not require this line of interpretation. Congress did not require independent use when finding home use
sound recording to be fair use." Id. at 453.
66. Sony, 659 F.2d at 972.
67. Id. The court of appeals also questioned the "noncommercial" characterization of home videorecording because of the corporate defendants' commercial
and economic interest in promoting such use. Id.
68. Id.
69. The district court had determined that increased access was consistent
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Characterizing the work as entertainment in nature, the court
of appeals found the second statutory factor, the nature of the
work, also to weigh against a finding of fair use, concluding that
the "scope of fair use is greater when informational type works,
[rather than] more creative products are involved. ' 70 In discussing
this factor, the district court had emphasized the fact that the

plaintiffs had voluntarily chosen to broadcast their copyrighted
materials over the public airwaves, free-of-charge.7 1 The court of
appeals criticized the lower court's focus on the method of distribution as being irrelevant to this factor of the fair use analysis.

In discussing the third factor, the substantiality of the use, the

district court had recognized that "[g]enerally, the more substantial the taking from the copyrighted work, the less likely it is that
the fair use defense will be available. 7' Acknowledging that the
typical home user of a videotape recorder copies the entire work,

the district court determined that this would not preclude the de-

with the first amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through the public airwaves. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 454. The court of appeals, however, found this suggestion was entirely without merit, stating, "[tihe
first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." Sony, 659 F.2d at 972 (citations omitted). A discussion of the
potential conflict between copyright and the first amendment is beyond the scope
of this article. See generally Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970);
Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1161 (1975); Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment:
A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. Symp. 43 (1971). For some of the
leading cases in this area, see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard
Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
70. Sony, 659 F.2d at 972.
71. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 453. Although the nature of the work has not been
discussed extensively in the cases, both courts recognized that when this factor is
addressed, it is often asked whether the nature is such that "distribution would
serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information." Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). The district court avoided this traditional question by
refusing to categorize the works involved and focused instead on the medium of
presentation. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 452-53.
72. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
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fense of fair use because the four factors must be considered collectively.7 3 The court of appeals was critical of the district court's
analysis of this factor. 74 The Ninth Circuit considered the substantiality of the taking involved in home videorecording to weigh
clearly in favor of the copyright owner. 5
The reviewing court also disagreed with the approach taken by
the lower court in analyzing the fourth factor, the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.7
The court of appeals' discussion focused on two difficulties which
often present obstacles for the copyright plaintiff: proof of actual
damages and proof of harm from the activities of specific defendants. The court addressed both of these concerns by asking
whether the infringing work tends to diminish or prejudice the potential market for the copyrighted work when the full scope of the
infringing practice is taken into consideration. From this perspec73. The district court reasoned that since the fair use factors are to be
weighed together with no one factor given special priority, "this taking of the
whole still constitutes fair use, because there is no accompanying reduction in the
market for 'plaintiff's original work.'" Id.
74. Sony, 659 F.2d at 973. The cases distinguished by the district court
"clearly did not limit their discussion of 'substantiality' to cases in which the
plaintiff had been harmed." Id. According to the court of appeals, "the cases were
based in part on the notion that copyright is a property interest [which entitles]
the author ... to control access to his work, and absent compelling justifications,
this right should not be abridged." Id.
75. Id. In fact, the court suggested that this statutory factor alone might be
sufficient in the proper case to preclude the fair use defense. See infra note 108
and accompanying text.
76. Sony, 659 F.2d at 973. "[T]he district court was much too strict in requiring appellants to establish its degree of harm .

..

[and] did not pay sufficient

attention to the cumulative effect of mass reproduction of copyrighted works
made possible by videotape recorders." Id. at 973-74 (emphasis in original).
The district court had considered the plaintiffs' theories of probable harm to
be based upon assumptions that were not only speculative, but to some extent
inconsistent and illogical, and therefore was hesitant "to identify 'probable effects' of home-use copying." Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 452. The court also noted that
the extent of harm predicted was unclear. Plaintiffs claimed that if the sale of
Betamax were not enjoined, their profits would decrease and they might not recover their production costs on some programs. Since plaintiffs did not allege that
they would be compelled to stop producing entirely, the lower court suggested
that marketing alternatives were available to recoup some of the predicted loss
and plaintiffs were capable of competing with the VTR industry by producing
their own cassettes. The district court concluded that copyright law "does not
protect authors from change or new considerations in the marketing of their products." Id. at 452.
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tive, the court of appeals concluded that the copyright owner
clearly should have prevailed."
Liability of the Corporate Defendants
Having determined that home videorecording constituted a di-

rect infringement of copyright and was not a fair use, the court of

appeals found the corporate defendants liable as contributory infringers for their participation in the manufacture and sale of the
Betamax.7 The court adopted the definition of contributory infringement used by the district court: "[O]ne who, with knowledge
of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer. ' ' 79 However, contrary to the lower court's holding,80 the Ninth Circuit found the corporate defendants satisfied
the two-prong test implicit in the definition. 8
Addressing the knowledge element of the test, the court of appeals concluded that it is not necessary that a contributory infringer have actual knowledge that the activity which he makes
possible constitutes copyright infringement (as a legal conclusion).,s It is sufficient that a copyright defendant has knowledge of
the infringing activity to hold him liable.88 Consequently, since use
77. Sony, 659 F.2d at 974.
78. Id. at 976.
79. Id. at 975 (quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted)).
80. The district court had concluded that even if it were to hold that homeuse copying was an infringement of copyright and was not fair use, it could not
find the corporate defendants liable for the infringement involved under any of
the plaintiffs' theories: direct infringement, contributory infringement, or vicarious liability. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 457.
81. Sony, 659 F.2d at 975.
82. Id. The district court had found that the corporate defendants' knowledge was insufficient to make them contributory infringers. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at
459. The court of appeals noted that this determination was based partially on
the lower court's assertion that the defendants could not know what copyright law
required since that issue had not been decided before the present lawsuit. Sony,
659 F.2d at 975.
83. The court of appeals noted that a copyright defendant's mistake as to the
legal consequences of his actions might affect the remedies available in an infringement action. Sony, 659 F.2d at 975. Section 504(c)(2) provides for a reduction of statutory damages to a sum not less than $100 if the "infringer was not
aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright," and a remission of statutory damages in certain circumstances if the infringer believed that his or her use was a fair use according to
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of the VTR to reproduce copyrighted materials is not only intended, expected and encouraged by the corporate defendants but
also provides the source of the product's consumer appeal, the
court of appeals found the knowledge element was clearly satisfied. 4 In addressing the second part of the test for contributory
infringement, "inducement or material contribution,"85 the reviewing court quite summarily stated that "[t]he corporate defendants
8' 6
are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be held accountable.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's reliance on the
"staple article of commerce" theory as being inappropriate.87 Reasoning that since the primary purpose of videotape recorders is to
reproduce television programming (nearly all of which is copyrighted), it necessarily follows that videotape recorders are not
"suitable for substantial noninfringing use."8 8
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The Ninth Circuit's determination that home videorecording
§ 107. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
84. Sony, 659 F.2d at 975.

85. The district court's analysis of this element focused on its finding that

the videotape recorder was a staple article of commerce. The court stated that

[s]elling a staple article of commerce - e.g., a typewriter, a recorder, a
camera, a photocopying machine - technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of "contribution,"
if deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand the [contributory infringement] theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management.
Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 461. In making this conclusion, the district court analogized
to the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) which defines contributory infringement of a
patent and provides an exception for a "staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use."
In patent law, a person who sells a machine or composition which is suitable
for use in an infringing process can be held liable as a contributory infringer only
if the machine or composition is not capable of substantial noninfringing use. If
the machine can be used in an infringing process but is also capable of substantial
use that does not infringe, the seller is not liable as a contributory infringer. Elevator Appliance Co. v. Brooks, 101 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1939). See also Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1 (1912).
86. Sony, 659 F.2d at 975.
87. Id.
88. Id. The district court had noted only that the VTR's uses were varied,
and without specifically determining whether the VTR was capable of substantial
noninfringing use, found the underlying rationale for the patent law exception to
be persuasive nonetheless. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 461.
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does not enjoy a special implied exemption under the 1976 Copyright Act appears to be well founded. The statutory scheme itself
requires the conclusion that the 1976 Act contains no implied exemption. As there is nothing in the language, legislative history or
debates to suggest that Congress intended to limit copyright own-

ers' rights in ways not specified in sections 107-118,89 the limitation

would have been explicitly set forth in the statute, if Congress had
intended to exclude home videorecording from the copyright owners' monopoly.' 0
The argument for an implied exemption in the home videorecording context is based almost entirely on the analogy to the
sound recording situation. Courts 91 and commentators 2 have generally assumed that home audiorecording is beyond the scope of
the copyright regime, either because Congress intended to exempt
home recording from the coverage of the Copyright Act or because
it constitutes fair use. 8
o
The Ninth Circuit's approach to the fair use analysis was
somewhat unprecedented. The court seemed to treat the productive/intrinsic question as a threshold consideration in its analysis.
However, having concluded that without a productive use 4 the fair
use doctrine does not apply, the court followed the traditional
89. See supra note 21.
90. The House Report to the 1976 Act states:
The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive
rights in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus,
everything in section 106 is made "subject to sections 107 through 118,"
and must be read in conjunction with those provisions.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 61, reprinted in 1976 CONG. NEWS at 5674.
91. See, e.g., Sony, 659 F.2d at 967-68; Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 444-46; Elektra
Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
92. See Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating Public Access and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243, 247 n.18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Betamax Case]; Note, supra note 59, at 1011-12.
93. In a recent article, a noted authority, UCLA law professor Melville B.
Nimmer, argues that "there is not and never has been an exemption from copyright liability for audio home recording." He relies on the language of the House
Report to the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 and the statements of interested individuals to conclude that Congress did not intend to create a special exemption for home recording when it passed the amendment. If this conclusion is
correct, the case for an analogous exemption for home videotaping is without
foundation. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling
the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982).
94. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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analysis generally employed by the courts and evaluated the factors outlined in section 107. 95 This, the court found, provided additional support for its initial determination - "the fair use doctrine
does not sanction home videorecording." s
Although there may be some support for the conclusion that
without a productive use there can be no fair use, this rather inflexible holding of the court is "completely contrary to the spirit of
§ 107 - which is not intended to 'freeze' fair use to any 'exact
rules' but rather is to enable adaptation on a 'case-by-case basis.'",,s The courts may find that in most circumstances fair use is
not justified when a "non-productive" use is involved. However,
the outright limitation of fair use to solely productive use, seems to
restrict the freedom that courts have previously enjoyed in adapting this "equitable rule of reason" to the endless variety of situations that confront them.
The purpose of the use, whether characterized as for entertainment, increased access, or convenience, clearly does not fall
within one of the traditional categories."8 The preamble to section
107 does not mention any of these as purposes for which the doctrine of fair use can be invoked."9 However, as the listing of purposes is intended to be merely illustrative and no one factor in section 107 determinative or definitive, the absence of access,
convenience or entertainment in the statute should not necessarily
preclude application of fair use to a case involving them.'
95. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.

96. Sony, 659 F.2d at 971.

97. Selected Portions of Petitioners'Brief in Sony Corp. of America v. UniPAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No.

versal City Studios, No. 81-1687, 24
595, at 463, 466 (Sept. 9, 1982).

98. See infra note 99.
99. The preamble contained in § 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).

100. It was pointed out in the 1975 Senate Report that:

The statements in this report with respect to each of the criteria of fair
use are necessarily subject to qualifications, because they must be applied in combination with the circumstances pertaining to other criteria,
and because new conditions arising in the future may alter the balance
of equities. It is also important to emphasize that the singling out of
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The first factor of section 107, namely the purpose and character of the use, seems to imply that fair use is applicable only to
noncommercial and particularly educational uses. However, the
case law clearly indicates that some commercial uses are fair uses
of a copyrighted work.10 1 Similarly, the fact that a given use serves
a non-profit educational purpose, does not necessarily demand a
finding of fair use.10 2 In any event, home videotaping does not fit
neatly into either category. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh
heavily on either side in determining whether home videotaping is
a fair use of a copyrighted material.
The court's conclusion that the nature of the work does not
support a finding of fair use is supported by precedent, since here
some instances to discuss in the context of fair use is not intended to
indicate that other activities would or would not be beyond fair use.
S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1975) (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,
626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (the use of old TV Guide covers by a newspaper in a
comparative advertising scheme promoting its own television program guide publication found to be a fair use despite defendant's commercial motive); Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (the use of
copyrighted material about Howard Hughes published in Look Magazine in a subsequent biography on Hughes was found to fall within the fair use doctrine). The
Rosemont court concluded that "whether an author or publisher has a commercial
motive ...

is irrelevant to a determination of whether a particular use of copy-

righted material in a work which offers some benefit to the public constitutes a
fair use." Id. at 307. See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 66, reprinted
in 1976 CONG. NEws at 5679.
102. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), holding that an educational cooperative's large-scale videotape reproduction of copyrighted works originally broadcast and recorded off-theair did not constitute fair use. The plaintiffs in Encyclopaedia Britannica were
engaged in the business of producing and distributing educational audiovisual
materials to educational institutions, related organizations and television networks. The defendant, an educational cooperative, recorded plaintiff's copyrighted works off-the-air and operated a highly organized and systematic program
for reproducing videotapes for distribution to over 100 affiliated schools for classroom educational use. The court found the massive scope of the videotaping practices and the sophisticated methods of copy production and distribution could not
be considered reasonable, even under the most favorable light of fair use for nonprofit educational purposes. Id. at 1181. See also Withtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777
(8th Cir. 1962) (a choral instructor's unauthorized use of a song in a new arrangement made by him and adapted for use by the high school choir was held not to
constitute fair use); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983) (a food service instructor's incorporation of a substantial portion of a copyrighted cake decorating booklet into her own pamphlet for use in her career classes held not fair
use).
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the works of Walt Disney and Universal can probably be best described as entertainment.103 However, the court failed to acknowledge that not all television programming can accurately be characterized as entertainment in nature. Many other televised works
may inform or educate. In fact, news broadcasts, documentaries
and current affairs programs might be more appropriately categorized as information-type works. Consequently, it is arguable that
increased access to such programs would indeed further' 104the "public's interest in the free dissemination of information.

In the past, courts have sanctioned the fair use of a copyrighted work ranging from a few quotations 05 to the photocopying
of entire articles.1 06 Generally however, the more substantial the
appropriation from the copyrighted work, the less likely fair use
will be permitted.10 7 In fact, several courts have held that the fair
use defense is never appropriate when the copying of an entire
103. Entertainment works are less likely to support a claim of fair use.
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), held that showings of the silent film, "The Son of the Sheik," by an educational broadcasting
station did not qualify as a fair use of the plaintiffs copyright in the novel. The
Rohauer court stated that "[ilt can scarcely be argued here that the enduring
fame of Rudolf Valentino or the intrinsic literary merit of The Son of the Sheik
(whatever it may be) served any public interest sufficient to endow these defendants with the privilege of fair use." Id. at 733.
In Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958), the court held that a burlesque television presentation of the copyrighted motion picture photoplay "Gaslight" could
not be defended on the ground that it was fair use. See also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). "The availability of the fair use defense is additionally constricted if the copyrighted work is creative, imaginative, and original and
represents a substantial investment of time and labor made in anticipation of
financial return." Id. at 182.
104. Rosemont Enterprises, 366 F.2d at 307. This public interest rationale
was followed by the court in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court held the public's interest in having the fullest information available on the assassination of President Kennedy justified the
reproduction of various frames of plaintiffs copyrighted motion picture film in a
book dealing with the assassination as fair use. See supra note 71.
105. Rosemont Enterprises, 366 F.2d at 306 (two direct quotations and one
eight-line paraphrase used). See supra note 101.
106. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (entire journal articles photocopied but generally limited to single article of fifty pages or less). See supra
note 60.
107. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
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work is involved.10 8 Thus, the fact that home-use recording usually
involves copying the entire work clearly argues against a fair use
finding on this ground.
The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the harm factor set out in
section 107 failed to take into account the distinction between the
time-shifting 0 9 and librarying"' uses of a videotape recorder and
the effect of this distinction upon the potential market or value of
the copyrighted work.1 ' The effect upon the potential market for
the copyrighted work may depend in large part upon the mode in

which the recording is used." 2 A user who temporarily tapes a

program for delayed viewing may still wish to view its rerun on
television or in the theater. The user who permanently records a
program for his library, however, is unlikely to be in the rerun audience. Furthermore, a user who maintains a library is equally unlikely to purchase a videotape which is commercially produced
under license from the copyright owner, although a time-shifting
user might very well do so.
The conclusion by the Ninth Circuit that the manufacturer,
distributor, advertiser and retailers of the Betamax videotape re-

108. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th
Cir. 1978) (excessive copying precludes fair use); Rosemont Enterprises,366 F.2d
at 310; Withtol, 309 F.2d at 780. But see Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353
(The proposition that "the copying of an entire copyrighted work ...cannot ever
be 'fair use'. . . is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the decisions, and
rejected by years of practice."). See supra notes 60 & 106. However, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, the court in distinguishing Williams & Wilkins noted that
"there was a significant difference between copying an entire article from a medical journal and reproducing an entire copyrighted work on videotape." 542 F.
Supp. at 1179. See supra note 102.
109. Time-shifting contemplates that the user records a program at a time
when it is not possible for him to otherwise view it, views the program at some
time which is convenient for him, and thereafter erases the recording.
110. In librarying, the user records the program and stores the recording for
repeated viewing.
111. This distinction has been recognized by many of the writers in considering the harm factor in relation to home recording. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 3, at
244-46; Note, Copyright: Gone with the Betamax?, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 45, 53-56 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Note, Gone with the Betamax?];
Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement, 52 S. CALIF. L. REV. 573,
580, 614-17 (1979); Note, supra note 59, at 1014-16.
112. In discussing the harm issue, the court of appeals focused on the cumulative effect of home videorecording rather than examining each of the various
uses of the Betamax individually. For a discussion of the predicted harmful effects resulting from (1) recording without viewing; (2) time-shifting; (3) librarying;
and (4) commercial avoidance, see Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 465-68.
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corders were liable as contributory infringers for the direct infringement caused by home recording of television broadcasts,"'
appears to be an extension of the theory of contributory infringement. 4 However, once direct infringement was found, the court
may have reasoned that in light of the obvious impracticality of
suing individual Betamax owners, holding the manufacturer and
sellers accountable was necessary to give meaning to its decision. 18
In the leading case of Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, Inc., 16 a concert artists' management company was held liable as a contributory and vicarious infringer
where the company had sponsored the creation of local concert associations to provide audiences for artists, knowing that copyrighted works would be performed without authorization. The
cases generally follow this pattern. Where liability has been established, the contributory infringer has had either actual 17 or constructive 1 knowledge of the infringing activity by the direct
113. Sony, 659 F.2d at 976.
114. The theory of contributory infringement of copyright is a judicially cre-

ated and evolved doctrine, the boundaries of which are not always clear. 3 M.

supra note 9, § 12.04.
115. Although the cases involving contributory infringement are relatively
few, a statement made by Justice Holmes seems applicable to the present
0
situation:
The defendant [producer] not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story [the infringing activity]. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which [the /
films] could be used, and the one for which especially they were made. If
the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is impossible to
do so except by taking part in the final act [of direct infringement]. It is
liable on principles recognized in every part of the law.
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911). Similarly, the Betamax is
manufactured and advertised to be used by consumers in recording copyrighted
television programs off-the-air.
116. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
117. See, e.g., Sony, 659 F.2d at 975 ("The corporate appellees 'know' that
the Betamax will be used to reproduce copyrighted material."); Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947) (writer for an infringing
motion picture photoplay liable because he had selected the material for the photoplay knowing that it had been used in another picture); Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916) (printer and seller of infringing photograph
liable along with photographer).
118. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (motions for summary judgments were denied defendants charged with contributory infringement because facts existed giving rise to
an inference of knowledge of the infringing activity).
NIMMER,
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infringer.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's characterization
of a videotape recorder as a staple article of commerce, finding instead that the Betamax was not suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 9 A Betamax does, however, have a number of noninfringing uses which include: 2 0 the reproduction of works that are
not protected by copyright, 2 ' use with a video camera,' 22 and the
taping of live transmissions that are not simultaneously recorded. 2 3 Moreover, the conclusion by the court of appeals-that
the corporate defendants were liable for contributory infringement
since the Betamax is a nonstaple article of commerce having no
substantial noninfringing use-is an expansion of the patent theory upon which it was based. 24
IMPLICATIONS

The impact of the Sony decision that home videorecording
constitutes a direct infringement of copyright and that the manufacture, promotion and sale of the Betamax (VTR) results in contributory copyright infringement, may extend well beyond the specific factual context of that litigation. If sustained by the Supreme
Court, not only will the entire videorecording industry be affected,
but concerns of the general public and others in the communications industry may be implicated. Additionally, given the reaction
from Congress, the decision may very well stimulate new legislation that addresses the problem of home videorecording.
119. Sony, 659 F.2d at 975.
120. For a more extensive discussion of the potential legal uses of a videotape
recorder, see Cole, supra note 3, at 248-51.
121. Works not protected by copyright would include: United States Government material (17 U.S.C. § 105); works in the public domain due to the expiration
of the statutory term (Id. §§ 302-305), faulty notice (Id. §§ 401, 405, 506), or
improper renewal (Id. § 304(a)).
122. The Betamax and other videotape recorders may be used in connection
with a video camera. A user is able to record one's own film on a videocassette
which may be played back on a monitor. See Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 436.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). For copyright protection to attach, a work must be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See also id. § 101.
124. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Under this provision, the contributory patent infringer must not only sell a nonstaple article having no substantial noninfringing
use but also must have actual knowledge of the particular patent infringed. See
Oddi, Product Simulation and Contributory Trademark Infringement: A Right
Suggests A Wrong, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 601, 617 & n.94, 618 (1983); see also Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro II).
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The decision may have ramifications outside the videorecording industry, most notably in the area of sound recording. First,
the Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests that the previous exemption
for home audiotaping may have been abolished by the 1976 Act. 25
Theoretically, this could render home audiotapers liable for direct
copyright infringement. Moreover, if the court of appeals' analysis
of contributory infringement is correct, the same rationale applied
to the manufacturers and sellers of sound recording equipment
might subject them to liability as contributory infringers. Furthermore, the decision may even affect technologies not yet fully developed, since a remedy adverse to the interests of the telecommunications industry might inhibit research and investment in the field.
The decision recognizing infringement will also force the court
to fashion a remedy that will adequately redress the injury. It
would accomplish nothing to impose liability for contributory infringement if no workable remedy exists. Alternatively, the decision may have the effect of provoking a legislative solution to the
problem of home videorecording."1e The court of appeals' decision
was most likely rendered, knowing that an appeal to the Supreme
Court would be sought, thus providing sufficient time for Congress
to respond.
Since the most immediate effect of the decision will be the potential economic and social impact upon the videorecording industry, the remedy chosen will be significant. The standard statutory
remedies available to a successful copyright owner in an infringement action are: (a) injunctions; 12 7 (b) actual damages and profits;128 (c) statutory damages; 2 9 and (d) costs and attorney's fees. 30
125. The court of appeals quoted with seeming approval a passage from Nimmer which suggests that the absence of language recognizing the home recording
exemption in the legislative history accompanying the 1976 Act, is indicative of an
altered intention on the part of Congress, particularly in light of the fact that
other passages from the House Report for the 1971 Amendment were incorporated verbatim. Sony, 659 F.2d at 967 n.5 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, §
13.05[F][5] n.159). Congress has already implicitly recognized this potential conflict in the legislation that has been proposed since the Sony decision was rendered. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) provides for the granting of temporary and final injunctions with the court having discretion to fashion such terms as it finds reasonable to prevent or restrain infringements of copyright.
128. Id. § 504(b). The copyright owner's actual damages resulting from the
infringement are recoverable, plus any profits of the infringer attributable to the
infringement which have not been taken into account in computing actual dam-
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Going beyond the remedies provided by the statute, the court of
appeals also suggested that in the context of home-use videorecording, an award of continuing royalties might be an appropriate remedy. " ' As the Ninth Circuit noted, "[t]he relief question is
exceedingly complex.' 32 Examination of each of the remedies suggested by the court of appeals illustrates the inadequacy of the
traditional copyright infringement remedies in this context.
The plaintiffs in Sony requested the district court to fashion
injunctive relief that would bar the manufacture and sale of the
Betamax and Betamax tapes, or alternatively require Sony to install some sort of mechanism that would render the Betamax incapable of recording copyrighted works off-the-air. 133 However, mandating the withdrawal of the Betamax from the market would
effectively shut down a new and vigorous industry. Considering the
economic and social consequences stemming from the shutdown of
an entire communications industry, as well as the fact that potentially noninfringing uses of a videotape recorder exist,134 this seems
like an unduly repressive remedy. Furthermore, an injunction
might diminish economic incentives for the telecommunications industry generally, thus inhibiting research and experimentation in
the field. This deleterious effect upon the promotion of science and
the useful arts should be considered in balancing the equities of
this alternative.
The primary measure of recovery of actual damages is based
upon the extent to which the market value of the copyrighted work
at the time of infringement has been injured or destroyed by such
infringement. "' Accordingly, plaintiffs would have to show the loss
ages. Section 504(a) offers the copyright owner the option to choose actual damages and profits or statutory damages.
129. Id. § 504(c). Statutory damages may be elected at any time before final
judgment has been rendered. The court is given the discretion to make an award
between $250 and $10,000 for "all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work." In an action involving the infringement of multiple works
or separately liable infringers, the statutory damage award may be multiplied.
130. Id. § 505. The awarding of costs and attorney's fees is within the court's
discretion.

131. Sony, 659 F.2d at 976.

132. Id. "[Tihe difficulty in fashioning relief may well have influenced the

district court's evaluation of the liability issue." Id.
133. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 463.
134. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.

135. See Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.

1947).
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in value of their copyrights resulting from home videorecording.
Given the fact that they admitted at trial that no actual harm to
their copyrights had yet occurred from the then existing videotaping practices,' 3 6 the difficulty in proving the precise nature of the
harm from the copyright infringement makes this remedy appear
unworkable. Consequently, election of statutory damages might be
an attractive option for the plaintiffs.
The court in its discretion could assess statutory damages between $250 and $10,000 for infringement of each independent work
involved.13 7 If Sony were able to prove that it was not aware that
home videorecording constituted an infringement of copyright, the
court might take Sony's "innocence" into account and reduce the
statutory award to a minimum of $100.13s Nonetheless, in cases
such as this involving multiple infringements, the awarding of statutory damages could produce enormous windfalls.' 39 The Ninth
Circuit implicitly recognized the inadequacy of the traditional remedies by taking the novel approach of recommending a judicially
created compulsory license as an acceptable resolution in the context of home videorecording.
In its discussion of injunctive relief, the court of appeals noted
that generally a copyright plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction when liability has been established and there is a threat
of continuing violations. " However, the court quoted, with apparent approval, Nimmer who suggests that "when great public injury
would result from an injunction, a court could award. . . a contin136. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 451. At the time of trial, no measurable monetary
damage, economic or revenue loss had been attributed to the sale or use of the
Betamax. On the contrary, both Universal and Disney had experienced an extremely profitable year in 1978. However, plaintiffs maintained that prospective
harm to the value of their copyrights was an imminent effect of continued
Betamax usage. Id. at 439-40. For a complete discussion of the predicted harmful
effects, see id. at 465-69.
137. See supra note 129.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
139. For example, at the set minimum of $250 per infringement, if 4000
Betamax owners were to each make a videotape of a televised movie, statutory
damages would total $1 million. Courts have been reluctant to award such large
sums for multiple infringements. See, e.g., Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 340-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court in Davis concluded that
a simultaneous broadcast of an infringing work over 162 television stations constituted only one infringement and expressed concern over the absurd result had it
found otherwise. Id. at 349.

140. Sony, 659 F.2d at 976.
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uing royalty." 14 Such royalty would presumably be based upon either a designated percentage of the manufacturer's gross receipts
from the sale of the VTRs 2 or a flat fee for entering the VTR
market.
In the videotape recording context, the imposition of a compulsory licensing scheme would provide a practicable method for
remunerating copyright owners for such home use, and society
would not be deprived the benefit of a significant technological advancement. Most of the commentators seem to endorse some sort
of licensing arrangement, although they disagree as to whether it
should be judicially or legislatively imposed."" Given that such a
system must be applied, if at all, to all manufacturers of videotape
recorders and given the administrative problems in distributing
royalties, such a compulsory licensing system would seem to be
better addressed by legislation than by judicial decision."
141. Id. The passage from Nimmer relied upon by the court of appeals in
support of a judicially created compulsory license states:
Ordinarily it would be improper, and even an abuse of discretion for a
court to deny a permanent injunction where liability and a threat of continuing infringement have both been established. But if one looks to
other areas of property law it is clear that a property owner may be denied a permanent injunction against further violations of his property
right where such an injunction would work a substantial injury to the
public interest as well as to that of theparticular defendant. In such
circumstances the property owner may be awarded, in lieu of an injunction, a reasonable royalty for the further use of his property. The courts
might well conclude that photocopying practices for private use, particularly in the area of scientific writings, involve just such a public interest,
so that a judicially created compulsory license as a substitute for injunctive relief could be found appropriate.
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[E][4][e].
142. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) imposes a similar compulsory license upon cable
systems. Cable operators pay an annual fee based on a specified percentage of
gross revenues to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT), which makes distributions to copyright owners according to an agreed upon formula. Id. § 111(d).
143. Commentators who endorse a legislatively imposed licensing system include: Note, Gone with the Betamax?, supra note 111, at 60-62; Note, The
Betamax Case, supra note 92, at 260-61. See also Nimmer, supra note 93, at
1529-34 (endorsing either a judicially or statutorily imposed royalty system for
the sales of audiorecording equipment).
144. The 1976 Act provides for a statutorily imposed compulsory license in
four circumstances: Section 111(c)-(d) (retransmission of copyrighted works by
cable radio and television systems); § 115 (production and distribution of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works); § 116 (public performance of copyrighted musical works on a juke box); § 118 (use of certain works in connection
with noncommercial broadcasting).
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Ideally, copyright legislation should provide sufficient incentive for artistic creation to promote widespread dissemination of
creative and intellectual works, but without imposing unnecessary
costs upon the general public. The issues created by videotape recording technology in the context of the Sony case require careful
consideration. The legislature would provide a forum where all interests could be represented. 1 5 Furthermore, the legislature may
inquire more broadly into all issues spawned by the development
of this new technology1 46 in formulating a solution that recognizes
14 7
the needs of both authors and the public.
The Ninth Circuit's decision prompted an immediate response
from Congress.4 The proposed legislation has followed two paths.
One group of bills would simply exempt all private, noncommercial
videotaping from copyright liability."' Other proposals would exempt both home video- and audiorecording from copyright liability
and also provide copyright owners, by means of a compulsory license, compensation for use of the works.8 0 The royalties imposed
would be paid by the importers and manufacturers of video- and
audiorecording equipment and would be distributed among the
145. Interested parties might include other manufacturers and sellers of
videorecording equipment, other copyright owners of audiovisual works, actors
and actresses whose contracts often provide for remuneration based upon profits
from motion picture films, as well as members of the general public.
146. Other issues created by the videorecording technology noted by the district court include: tape swapping; tape duplication by individuals, groups or corporations; and off-the-air recording for classroom use. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 442.
147. The responses of foreign countries and international copyright organizations to the videotaping problem may prove to be insightful. The copyright law
of the Federal Republic of Germany provides an excellent model for legislation.
Gesetz tiber Urheberrechte und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz)
(German Copyright Act) of Sept. 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 1273, art.
53 (W. Ger.), amended Mar. 2, 1974, BGB1 I 475 (W. Ger.), English translation

reprinted in COPYRIGHT

LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD

(UNESCO

AND

BNA),

at Germany (Federal Republic of): Item 1, Copyright Statute (as amended up to
Mar. 2, 1974).
148. See supra note 43. Legislative efforts to resolve the controversy generated by the home videorecording of copyrighted works have continued in the 98th
Congress. New proposals to amend the Copyright Act include: H.R. 175, H.R.
1030, S. 175, S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Full texts of these bills can be
found in 25 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 612, at 211 (Jan. 13,
1983) and id. No. 616, at 317-24 (Feb. 10, 1983).
149. S. 1758, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 175, H.R.
175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
150. H.R. 5705, Amendment No. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982);
S. 31, H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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copyright owners.1

51

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit in Sony was confronted with the issue of
whether the home videorecording of copyrighted works off-the-air
for noncommercial use is an infringement of copyright. In this case
of first impression, the court resolved the question in favor of the
copyright owner, concluding that home taping constitutes a direct
infringement of copyright. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit significantly decided that fair use requires a productive use.
Furthermore, the court of appeals held the manufacturers and sellers of the Betamax (VTR) liable for contributory infringement.
The relief determination will have a significant economic impact
upon the general public and other telecommunications industries,
as well as the videorecording industry.
Accordingly, there is a need for a remedy which will balance
the public's interest in increased access to television programming,
with the rights and economic incentives of copyright owners. An
acceptable resolution must reflect careful harmonization of the divergent interests. Given the competing interests at stake, the conflict is a matter particularly suited for resolution by Congress.
DENISE

M.

HIGGINS

151. The legislation proposed in the 98th Congress takes a new approach towards establishing fair royalty fees. The new bill differs from earlier proposals in
that the free market would establish the royalty rates, rather than the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal. The Home Recording Act of 1983 (S. 31, H.R. 1030) encourages
the private negotiation of reasonable royalty fees between the copyright owners
and the manufacturers and importers of videorecording equipment. If a voluntary
agreement is not reached, the parties must submit to binding arbitration. The
results of the arbitration proceedings would be subject to public comment, confirmation by the Registrar of Copyrights, and judicial review.

